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RESPONSE 
Court-Agency  Dialogue:  Article  III’s  Dual  
Nature and the Boundaries of Reviewability 
Emily Hammond* 
ABSTRACT 
Courts reviewing agency actions frequently offer more than a positive 
analysis of the agencies’ decisions.  They might engage in advice-giving, for 
example, or temper the remedy as a way of modulating the impact of review.  
These actions can be used in a dialogic way, to provide normative signals to 
agencies.  Yet because courts must judge agency actions only on the grounds 
provided by the agency  at  the  time  of  the  agency’s  decision—and must ordinarily 
remand actions that fail to meet substantive standards of review—these normative 
signals require a delicate touch so as to avoid judicially imposed policy 
preferences and any chipping away at Article III values.  In his excellent study of 
the ordinary remand rule, Professor Christopher J. Walker traces the 
development of the rule and constructs a taxonomy of dialogic tools that might 
profitably accompany remands.  This Response praises Professor Walker’s  
contribution to the literature, and suggests several areas for future study.  In 
particular, this Response emphasizes the dual nature of Article III—consisting 
both of powers and resistance norms—and suggests that a full account of court-
agency dialogue ought to be mindful of this duality.  Further, this Response 
suggests that agency actions at the edges of reviewability offer a unique focal 
point for considering how the competing Article III concerns operate.  And finally, 
this Response cautions that taken too far, dialogic tools can undermine judicial 
responsibility  and  agencies’  constitutional  legitimacy. 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  My thanks to 
Chris Walker for the dialogue regarding this Response. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When courts review agency actions, they can offer signals to agencies 
and others beyond mere holdings and surficial reasoning on particular 
points of law.  At times this is apparent from the force of strongly-worded 
opinions.1  More subtly, courts sometimes engage in advice-giving—
providing alternative rationales that presumably would have met the 
applicable standard of review.2  The remedies available to courts also vary 
the impact with which they have spoken.3  Regardless, the tools that courts 
use in their dialogues with agencies ought to be viewed as devices that 
necessarily impact the constitutional balance of powers.  In Professor 
Christopher  Walker’s  thoughtful,  hardworking  study  of  agencies’  tools  for  
enhancing court-agency dialogue, he develops a number of insights about 
this balance of powers from an empirical assessment of the ordinary 
remand rule in action.4  I am honored to provide this Response. 
This Response proceeds as follows.  Part I uses the ordinary remand 
 
 1 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (D. 
Ariz. 2003) (calling an agency  interpretation  “knowingly  unlawful”). 
 2 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(offering hypothetical ways in which agency might have lawfully reconciled various 
statutory provisions).  For purposes of Professor Walker’s article, this Response, and my 
own past work, there is little need to distinguish between arbitrary and capricious, 
substantial evidence, and the Chevron two-step standards.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(agency action can be set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law”); id. § 706(2)(E) (agency action can be set aside if 
“unsupported by substantial evidence”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984) (applying two-step formula to review under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(C) (agency action shall be set aside if “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 
or limitations, or short of statutory right”)); Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and 
Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1732–35 (2011) (“Although 
these standards differ in their phrasing, each attempts to pair judicial deference with a 
reasoned decisionmaking requirement.”). 
 3 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1737–39 (discussing deference and remedies to 
unlawful agency action); see also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies 
and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 370–71 (2003) 
(contending remands without vacatur promote collaboration between courts and agencies). 
 4 Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for 
Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1590–1600 (2014). 
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2014] COURT-AGENCY DIALOGUE 173 
rule as a springboard for a brief overview of the role of administrative law 
doctrine in furthering administrative legitimacy.  This discussion sets the 
stage  for  a  more  detailed  look  at  Professor  Walker’s  findings  and  analysis,  
which is the subject of Part II.  Part  II  highlights  one  of  Professor  Walker’s  
most intriguing findings—an apparent Article III motivation in some 
courts’   treatment   of   the   ordinary   remand   rule.      This   Part   applauds   that  
insight, but argues further that a normative framework for assessing court-
agency dialogue  ought  to  be  mindful  of  Article  III’s  dual nature.  That is, 
Article  III  supports  both  the  courts’  countermajoritarian  power  and  various  
resistance norms meant to avoid interbranch conflicts and politically 
motivated outcomes when possible.  Part III uses two examples—the 
standard of review for agency inaction5 and the exception under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)6 to reviewability for actions 
committed to agency discretion7—to illustrate how the differing sides of 
Article III bear on normative assessments of dialogic tools.  It further 
argues that the dialogic tools, taken too far, can undermine Article III 
values.      This   Response   concludes   that   Professor   Walker’s   Article   is   a  
valuable contribution both on its own and in the questions it raises for a 
continuing dialogue about how best to strike a balance amongst the 
branches in administrative law. 
I. THE ORDINARY REMAND RULE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY 
The ordinary remand rule stems from the SEC v. Chenery Corp. 
(“Chenery I”)8 principle, which provides that courts must review agency 
actions solely on the basis of the rationales provided by the agencies 
themselves.9  Thus, courts may not supply rationales for agency decisions 
that the agencies themselves have not provided.10  When the rationale for 
 
 5 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (providing authority to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed”). 
 6 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
 7 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 8 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 9 The doctrine’s pedigree is in a series of dialogic opinions issued in cases involving 
judicial review of an agency’s formal adjudications.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 
II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the propriety of [agency] 
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”); Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87 (“The 
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record 
discloses that its action was based.”); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional 
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 962 (2007) (explaining classification and 
noting APA had not yet been enacted at time of Chenery I). 
 10 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1735–37 (providing historical doctrinal account of 
the Chenery principle). 
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an agency action is lacking or inadequate, therefore, a court should apply 
the ordinary remand rule, and send the matter back to the agency.11  
According to Chenery I, this approach reinforces separation-of-powers 
principles   because   “agenc[ies] alone”   are   authorized   to   make   policy-
infused administrative judgments.12  Were courts to uphold or reject agency 
actions for reasons not developed by the agencies themselves, courts would 
“intrude  upon  the  domain  which  Congress  has  exclusively  entrusted  to  an  
administrative  agency.”13 
As discussed in more detail below, this reasoning reflects an Article III 
concern that courts ought to avoid imposing policy preferences on the 
democratically accountable branches.  Further, scholars have demonstrated 
that the Chenery I principle (and by extension, the ordinary remand rule) 
has deeper constitutional implications: it counterbalances broad delegations 
of discretion by requiring agencies to articulate how they have exercised 
their power.14  It is thus fundamental to “the very legitimacy of the 
administrative state.”15 
It is helpful here to consider another fundamental administrative law 
value that works in tandem with Chenery I to temper nondelegation 
concerns: the reason-giving requirement.  Put simply, courts cannot review 
agencies   on   the   basis   of   the   agencies’   rationales   if   the   agencies   do not 
provide those rationales.16  But the reason-giving requirement does much 
more.  It guards against arbitrariness, which, as Professor Lisa Bressman 
has convincingly argued, has constitutional implications.17  And it furthers 
procedural legitimacy as well as administrative law values by promoting 
participation, deliberation, and transparency.18  Thus, the Chenery I 
 
 11 See, e.g., INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (stating proper 
course is to remand to agency). 
 12 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Stack, supra note 9, at 1000; Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to 
Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1356–59, 1365 (2010). 
 15 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1735. 
 16 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting 
that an agency must “take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable 
the court to evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision”); Citizens to Pres. 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971) (describing need for 
administrative record to facilitate review). 
 17 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 466–74 (2003). 
 18 For an exhaustive treatment of the reason-giving requirement’s legitimizing 
features, see Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial 
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 323–26 
(2013). 
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principle, ordinary remand rule, and reason-giving requirement should be 
understood as reflecting a set of constitutionally-grounded rules that 
reinforce administrative legitimacy. 
II. DIALOGIC REMANDS AND THE THREE BRANCHES 
Given the constitutional implications of the Chenery I principle, 
ordinary remand rule, and reason-giving requirement, judicial behavior 
when remanding decisions merits close scrutiny.  In this regard, Professor 
Walker’s  piece  makes  several  contributions  to  the  literature.    Some  of  these  
contributions owe to his methodology: he examines hundreds of decisions 
citing recent Supreme Court precedent involving the ordinary remand rule, 
372 of which involve petitions to review Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) immigration orders.19  Thus, he is able to construct an important 
story about the court-agency relationship   in   a   context   where   people’s  
futures, and perhaps even lives, are at stake.20  In addition, he assembles 
what  he  terms  a  “toolbox” of administrative common law meant to enhance 
court-agency dialogue while preserving the separation-of-powers balance 
struck by the ordinary remand rule.21  Professor  Walker’s   toolbox   alone  
will have important impacts.22 
In addition to the insights gleaned from his empirical examination, 
Professor Walker tracks the development of the ordinary remand rule.23  He 
concludes that, although it originated with a focus on Article I 
considerations—i.e., courts   respect  Congress’s   intent   that   agencies  decide  
particular matters rather than courts—it also reflects Article II values 
related   to   the   executive’s   authority   to   faithfully   execute   the   law.24  This 
observation seems consistent with the doctrinal and theoretical 
 
 19 See Walker, supra note 4, at 1580 (describing the methodology used to examine the 
court-agency dialogue). 
 20 Using judicial reviews of BIA orders was an elegant choice because the Supreme 
Court recently offered its view of the ordinary remand rule in this very context not once, but 
three times.  By staying in the same context, Professor Walker avoided any siloing—a 
phenomenon in which lines of administrative law decisions develop unique features specific 
to particular agencies under review—that may have taken place were he to have focused on 
a different topical area.  Cf. generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-
Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (considering the silo effect). 
 21 Walker, supra note 4, at 1607. 
 22 From a practical perspective, it is a resource for courts and litigants seeking 
authority for flexible case-management approaches in the administrative law context.  
Moreover, by arranging the tools according to their dialogic promise and filtering those 
tools through a constitutional powers perspective, Professor Walker adds further value for 
courts and scholars alike. 
 23 Walker, supra note 4, at 1561–79. 
 24 Id. at 1564–65. 
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development of administrative law more generally: after all, Chenery I 
came   on   the   heels   of   the   New   Deal’s   legislative   outpouring,25 whereas 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.’s26 
rationale ushered in a strong focus on executive power.27 
What is more intriguing is that Professor Walker uncovers hints that 
courts are mindful of Article III powers when they depart from the ordinary 
remand rule.  For example, some courts in his dataset referenced process-
type concerns such as undue delay and unfair adjudicators when departing 
from the rule.28  He thus highlights two judicial powers relevant to 
administrative law: saying what the law is and protecting process-based 
rights.29  Indeed, a closer look at the data brings these concerns into focus.  
As noted above, BIA appeals involve high stakes; the number of 
observations in the dataset also suggests the decisions are quite numerous.  
These   attributes   may   heighten   the   courts’   countermajoritarian  
responsibilities and account for their occasional departures from the 
ordinary remand rule.30 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DUAL NATURE OF ARTICLE III 
But suppose one were to take one more step down the three-branch 
road and consider how the other set of Article III values—those grounded 
in judicial self-restraint—fare  in  the  article’s  account.    Although Professor 
Walker mentions Marbury v. Madison’s31 classic  assignment  of  the  courts’  
power to say what the law is,32 he might also engage that portion of the 
case that emphasizes courts are not to interfere with executive discretion 
because  “the  subjects  are  political.”33  Although this sounds like an Article 
II grounding, it also provides authority for what Professor Mark Seidenfeld 
 
 25 This time period saw frequent and broad delegations of authority to agencies.  See 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749, 1758–60 (2007) (outlining theories of administrative law over time); Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of 
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756–59 (2011) (tracking the history of agency 
models of behavior and deference to agency expertise). 
 26 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 27 See Bressman, supra note 25, at 1765 (“Chevron, more than any other case, is 
responsible for anchoring the presidential control model.”). 
 28 Walker, supra note 4, at 1587–88. 
 29 Id. at 1587–89. 
 30 Professor Walker hints at this notion, but does not go so far as to claim that 
protecting constitutional rights animates the courts’ departures from the ordinary remand 
rule.  Walker, supra note 4, at 1587–88. 
 31 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 32 Walker, supra note 4, at 1589. 
 33 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166. 
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has  called  “judicial  self-limitation.”34 
This concept of judicial restraint has  been  called  a  “resistance  norm,”35 
and  is  grounded  in  the  classic  concern  over  the  courts’  countermajoritarian  
difficulty.36  Although there is a robust literature in constitutional law on 
this topic,37 administrative law scholars could do more to engage this 
concept.38  The very idea of dialogue—which Professor Walker indeed 
engages—suggests that courts will self-impose limits on their own power 
to avoid confrontations with the other branches.39  On this understanding, 
could Chenery I be viewed as being grounded  in  Article  III’s  softer  norms? 
At the very least, this possibility warrants a closer look at judicial tools 
of  engagement.    For  one  thing,  doing  so  illustrates  that  Professor  Walker’s  
toolbox extends beyond the immediate context he studied to other types of 
adjudications as well as rulemakings.  Even better, it provides a frame for 
thinking   about   courts’   options   within   the   “grey   areas”   of   reviewability.    
Take two examples: the standard of review for agency inaction40 and the 
“committed   to   agency   discretion”   exception   to   judicial   review   found   in  
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA.41 
The reasons for these two examples are worth a pause.  Each is a tricky 
area of administrative law guided by separation-of-powers concerns; thus, 
both embody many of the considerations identified by Professor Walker as 
animating the ordinary remand rule.  But each is different from the review 
of adjudication context because each is an area where courts are much 
more skittish about overstepping their roles.  Whereas an agency 
adjudication provides a developed record and affirmative exercise of 
 
 34 Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 292 (2011). 
 35 See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000); see also Seidenfeld, 
supra note 34, at 276 n.8 (collecting sources and describing Young, supra,  as  “coining the 
phrase ‘resistance norm’ for a doctrine meant to discourage but not ban government action 
that impinges on constitutionally recognized interests”). 
 36 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 5 (1962)  (exploring  whether  “the  judicial  Power”  
under the Constitution was envisioned to include the authority to overrule duly passed 
majoritarian legislation). 
 37 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1724 n.3 (collecting several examples of constitutional 
law scholarship on dialogic considerations). 
 38 Professor Seidenfeld’s work grounding Chevron in Article III norms is an 
important exception.  See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 34. 
 39 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1777–80 (connecting dialogic considerations in 
administrative law to separation-of-powers values from constitutional law literature). 
 40 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (providing authority to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”). 
 41 Id. § 701(a)(2). 
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administrative power, agency inaction usually lacks a record and is in 
essence a decision not to exercise such power.  Similarly, the § 701 
exception applies when there is no standard by which a court can judge 
what  the  agency  has  done;;  there  is  “no  law  to  apply.”42  Although there is 
sometimes a record in such circumstances,43 there typically has been no 
exercise of administrative power, making it very difficult for courts to 
assess the lawfulness of the agency’s  behavior. 
As Professor Ron Levin has demonstrated, both of these examples are 
animated by separation-of-powers and comparative institutional 
competence concerns.44  They reveal judicial reluctance to interfere with 
agency priorities, are identified in part by the absence of a legal standard to 
help focus review, and lack an agency decision to help focus the issues on 
review.45  The Article III account would counsel that, where courts identify 
these possibilities, they should err on the side of demurring  in  the  agencies’  
favor because there are special risks that the courts would impose their own 
policy preferences were they to take up substantive review. 
And yet courts find ways to promote dialogue within these grey areas 
using tools like the ones Professor Walker identifies.  Where an agency 
fails to respond to a rulemaking petition, for example, a court might retain 
jurisdiction over the matter as a way of signaling its continued interest, yet 
refrain from issuing a writ of mandamus.46  For agency behavior within the 
§ 701 exception, a court might find it lacks jurisdiction to review the case 
but remind the parties of avenues for possible future review.47  Examples 
like these show that, even where concerns for Article III self-restraint may 
be heightened, courts can modulate their messages to simultaneously 
invoke their Article III power. 
Nevertheless, the tools should be used carefully to avoid tilting too far.  
Consider,   for   example,   Professor  Walker’s   tool   of   providing   hypothetical  
 
 42 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43 ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (explaining that 
otherwise unreviewable agency actions are not made reviewable by fact that the agency has 
provided reasons). 
 44 Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 689, 771–72 (1990). 
 45 Hammond & Markell, supra note 18, at 338. 
 46 E.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); cf. Walker, supra note 4, 1591–93 (discussing panel retention of jurisdiction). 
 47 E.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (finding no 
jurisdiction because act was committed to agency discretion, but making note of other 
avenues for judicial challenges); cf. Walker, supra note 4, at 1594–96 (discussing 
hypothetical solutions). 
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solutions to agencies along with their remand orders.48  His assertion that 
this practice is not particularly troubling may not hold true in all 
circumstances.  The following example demonstrates.49  Suppose a court 
holds an agency action invalid for failure to accommodate all of  a  statute’s  
provisions.  The court offers a hypothetical rationale that, it suggests, 
would have reasonably resolved the issue.  The court remands the rule 
without vacating it, and the agency does nothing for fifteen years, after 
which it adopts a new rule  supported  by  the  court’s  hypothetical  rationale.    
The new rule is easily upheld on a subsequent challenge. 
On one hand, this example suggests the value of court-agency 
dialogue.  After all, the agency benefitted from judicial guidance in 
developing its rationale on remand and was rewarded by a subsequent 
court.  Yet viewed from a practical perspective, the overall scenario looks 
close to rational basis review: an invalid agency rule remained in effect 
against   the   backdrop   of   a   court’s   hypothetical.      This, of course, was the 
very approach that Chenery I and its accompanying rules eschewed.  Given 
the constitutional grounding of Chenery I, the ordinary remand rule, and 
the reason-giving requirement, this example suggests a problematic 
exercise of judicial authority.50  Taking this understanding further, what 
appears to be an act of judicial self-restraint—remanding without vacatur—
becomes an abdication of the judicial role that simultaneously upsets the 
compromise of constitutionality that Chenery I established. 
This claim is not meant to reach too far, but is raised to illustrate that 
more work is needed to understand how the different Article III values play 
out as courts select their communication tools and couple those tools with 
remedies.  Given that the grey areas of reviewability sharpen these 
competing values, they may be fruitful areas for further exploration of the 
constitutional implications of dialogic tools.  And it is to Professor 




 48 See Walker, supra note 4, at 1594–96. 
 49 This example is loosely based on a series of cases culminating in Environmental 
Defense v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2007), which is outlined in detail at Hammond, 
supra note 2, at 1769–72. 
 50 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1782. 
